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Educational Loans In Bankruptcy
LAWRENCE KALEVITCH*

Educational loans are generally nondischargeable in bankruptcy and have been so since 1977.1 It is the purpose of this article to review four problem areas relating to educational loans in
bankruptcy. The first major section is a review of the judicial
treatment of the controversy which has developed over the dischargeability of educational loans during the so-called "gap period" created by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.2
The second section contains an examination of the dischargeability
of educational loans in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Third is an investigation of the dischargeability of educational loans in chapter 13
proceedings. The fourth section is a review of the practice of withholding transcripts of college work to defaulting student borrowers.
Before proceeding with the review of the four problem areas, a discussion of the specific statutory provisions relating to the discharge
of student loans in bankruptcy is in order.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON DISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS

Two federally supported educational assistance loans are of
particular significance to bankruptcy courts because of the frequency with which students have sought discharge of their obligations: (1) direct loans under the National Defense Education Act of
1958,3 or under Part E of Title IV of the Higher Education Act of
1965," and (2) insured or guaranteed loans under the Higher Education Act of 1965, Part B.5 The former were direct loans to stu* B.A. University of Massachusetts, 1966; J.D. St. Louis University, 1969;
LL.M. New York University, 1970. Assistant Professor of Law 1971-75, Associate
Professor of Law 1976-82, Professor of Law 1982-present, Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law (on leave 1982-83). Visiting Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center, 1982-83.
1. Higher Education Act of 1965, tit. IV, pt. B, § 439A, 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3

(1976), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp.

IV 1980).

2. Section 439A was repealed upon enactment of the reform law on November 6, 1978, while the new nondischargeability provision, § 523(a)(8), enacted
the same day, became effective on October 1, 1979.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-602 (amended 1972).
4. Id. §§ 1088-1119 (amended 1980).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087 (amended 1980). See In re Bruce, 3 Bankr. 77, 78
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dents by educational institutions with ninety percent of the loan
capital being supplied by the federal government. Such loans were
made at three percent interest, repayable in equal installments
over ten years. The latter were unsecured personal loans by banks,
savings and loan associations, credit unions and other commercial
lenders at seven percent interest and were guaranteed or insured
by the federal government. Because its annual funding was six
times larger than that of the direct loan program, the guaranteed/
insured loan program was of greater concern.
Under the Bankruptcy Act,1 both types of loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy. In response to growing concern over the
perceived abuse of discharge by student borrowers who, without
any attempt to repay their obligations, filed for discharge soon after graduation, the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States recommended that in the absence of
hardship, educational loans be nondischargeable unless the first
payment falls due more than five years prior to the petition for
bankruptcy.
Section 439A
On October 12, 1976, section 439A of the Higher Education
Act of 19659 was amended 0 to make loans guaranteed or insured
under that act nondischargeable in bankruptcy for a period of five
years after commencement of the repayment period unless payment from future earnings would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and his dependents. The amendment did not affect the dischargeability of direct loans. The legislative history indicates that
this change was adopted to stem the abuse by student borrowers of
the discharge provisions."
Section 523(a)(8)
When the ninety-fifth Congress began formulating a new
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
6. 3 Bankr. at 78.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1976) (repealed 1978).
8. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).

9. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (repealed 1978).

10. Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat.
2081.
11. S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODs
CONG. & AD. NEws 4731, 4744.
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bankruptcy law, there was considerable opposition to treating educational loans differently than other loans in bankruptcy. The
specter of serious abuses of bankruptcy law by students who
sought freedom from educational debts was raised,1 ' however, the
House Judiciary Committee rejected a proposed Senate amendment which would have made educational loans nondischargeable.1" Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, the successor
provision to section 439A, represents a compromise between the
House bill and the Senate amendment regarding educational loans.
As originally adopted and effective October 1, 1979, section
523(a)(8) declared that indebtedness to a governmental unit, or a
nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educational loan
was nondischargeable, unless such loan first became due before five
years before the date of the filing of the petition. This section excepted those debts which would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's' dependents.
This basically was a continuation of existing law as found in
section 439A but inadvertently was not as broad. Because section
523(a)(8) applied only to debts for higher educational loans owed
to a governmental unit or to a nonprofit institution of higher education, it would have had disparate effect upon student loan programs administered by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, such as the National Direct Student Loan (NDSL) program under which loans are made by both nonprofit and profitmaking institutions of higher education. 1'4 Under section 523(a)(8),
a student who obtained a NDSL loan from a profit-making institution of higher education would be free to have the loan discharged
in bankruptcy, while a student who borrowed through a non-profit
institution would be prohibited from discharge. Equally inconsistent results would obtain under the Guaranteed Student Loan
(GSL) and Health Education Assistance Loan (HEAL) programs.
Since federal funds provide the primary capital contributions for
NDSL loans and reimbursements to lenders for losses on unpaid
GSL and HEAL loans, Congress amended section 523(a)(8) so that
all loans made under these programs would receive uniform treatment in bankruptcy."'
12. H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977).
13. Id. at 132.

14. S. RaP. No. 230, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S.

CONG. & AD. NEws 936.

15. Id.

CODE
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Section 523(a)(8) as Amended
The enactment of Public Law 96-56's on August 14, 1979,

closed an unintentional gap period created by premature repeal of
section 439A. It also amended section 523(a)(8) to make clear that
any educational loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made or funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education, is nondischargeable in bankruptcy for a period of five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) unless it would cause
an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
Section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965 excepted
only debt resulting from loans insured or guaranteed under that
Act. Code section 523(a)(8) is broader. It excludes from discharge
debt "made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit" which
would include the United States as well as any state or municipal17
ity.

The amended section also excepts debt resulting from loans

made under federally supported direct loan programs previously
dischargeable under section 439A.
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE GAP PERIOD

As noted above, the repealed Bankruptcy Act had no specific
provision for discharging educational loans.18 In 1976, Congress
barred discharge of educational loans 9 in response to the use of
bankruptcy by recent graduates who were thought to be exploiting
the Bankruptcy Act's allowance of student loan discharge.2 0 To
avoid the practice of the "quickie discharge," section 439A barred
discharge of federally guaranteed or insured loans unless: (1) discharge was granted after a five-year period which commenced on
the date the loan became due; or (2) payment of the loan would
cause an undue hardship on the debtor and dependents."1 Section
16. 93 Stat. 387 (1979).
17. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.133 (15th ed. 1981).
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by 47 Stat. 1482
(repealed 1978) [hereinafter cited as Act]. Educational loans obtained by fraud or

misrepresentation could not be discharged under the Act, § 17(a)(2). However,
creditors had considerable difficulties proving the necessary elements of § 17(a)(2)
in consumer cases.
19. See supra note 1.
20. H.R. RaP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). These exceptional cases for
which discharge could be granted continue under the new Code. See 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1979).
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523(a)(8)" of the Bankruptcy Code, which succeeded section 439A,
retains these criteria for dischargeability. However, an oversight by
Congress has cast doubt upon the applicability of either section
439A or section 523(a)(8) to bankruptcy cases arising' 8 between
November 6, 1978, and August 14, 1979.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act 24' was enacted November 6,
1978, ' and was to take effect on October 1, 1979, unless otherwise
provided.26 Under section 402(d), certain sections of the Bankruptcy Reform Act were to take effect on enactment, November 6,
1978,' including section 31728 which repealed section 439A . This
repealer left no interim provision which would bar discharge of
educational loans until the Bankruptcy Code would take effect on
October 1, 1979.0

The absence of any prohibition against discharge of educational loans is curious since the repealed Bankruptcy Act and the
enacted Bankruptcy Code generally bar discharge. Section 403(a)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act states that cases commenced under
the Bankruptcy Act are to be decided as if the Bankruptcy Reform
Act had not been enacted.3 1 Section 403(a) appears to have been
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(i), (ii).
23. "Arising" is used here rather than "filed," or another more technical
term, because the courts have not agreed on whether an educational loan discharge matter falls into the gap period if the case was filed during the gap or if
the question was litigated during the gap. See infra text accompanying note 3754.
24. The bulk of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 [hereinafter also cited as the Code]. The remainder includes jurisdictional (principally codified at 28 U.S.C.), and effective dates or repealer sections, the latter of which created the issue discussed in this part of the
article.
25. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 402(a).
27. Id. § 402(d).
28. Id. § 317.
29. See supra note 1.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 402(a).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 402(a) provides:
A case commenced under the Bankruptcy Act, and all matters and proceedings in or relating to any such case, shall be conducted and determined under such Act as if this Act had not been enacted, and the substantive rights of parties in connection with any such bankruptcy case,
matter, or proceeding shall continue to be governed by the law appplicable to such case, matter, or proceeding as if the Act had not been
enacted.
The legislative history suggests similar blissful ignorance of the possibility of
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intended to govern cases filed before October 1, 1979, and would
have barred discharge by preserving section 439A during the transition period. Unfortunately, section 403(a), the savings clause for
2
the transitional period, did not take effect until October 1, 1979.
This would appear to be an error in drafting because on October 1,
1979 the entire Bankruptcy Reform Act would take effect, and a
savings clause would therefore be unnecessary.
An analysis of the technical repealer/effective date provisions
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act thus reveals a failure to make effective the savings provision, section 403(a). Consequently, educational loans were arguably dischargeable during this gap period.
The enactment of a corrective bill on August 14, 1979, dispelled
any doubts that the gap period was created by mistake. The corrective bill reinstated section 439A and applied it to "any proceeding commenced under the Bankruptcy Act during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending October 1,
1979.""8 The legislative history of the corrective bill confesses error
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act's repealer/effective date provisions;34 courts generally have interpreted the corrective bill as
shortening the gap period. Rather than ending the gap on September 30, 1979, the corrective amendment has been interpreted as
closing it on August 14, 1979.1 5
Courts have resolved the confusion about educational loan discharge during the gap period in several ways. The reported opinions acknowledge that the gap period arose out of mistake, and
often employ ingenious, if disingenuous, arguments to determine
treating cases under the old law as though the Code had not been enacted. H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., let Sess. 459 (1977).
32. Section 402(a) provides October 1, 1979, as the general effective date unless otherwise provided. Section 402(d) makes certain provisions effective on enactment but omits § 403(a).
33. Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387.
34. The Senate report on the corrective bill stated: "The gap in coverage of a
prohibition on the discharge in bankruptcy of loans made under the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program resulting from the early repeal of Section 349A [sic] is
very undesirable and totally inadvertent." S. REP. No. 230, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 1,
2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 936, 937.
35. See, e.g., Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aids Bd.v. Lipke, 630 F.2d 1225 (7th
Cir. 1980); In re Dodd, 1 COLLIER BANKS. CAS. 2d (MB) 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980); In re Kidwell, 4 Bankr. 685 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Freeman, 5
Bankr. 24 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980); In re Piccione, 1 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1979); In re Southard, 2 Bankr. 124 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1979).
Contra In re Dray, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1980).
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the issue of dischargeability."
Two separate issues have to be decided in determining dischargeability of educational loans affected by the gap period. The
first is what law is applicable to a claim of dischargeability of an
educational loan in a case potentially affected by the gap period.
The erroneous repealer/effective date provisions of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act create the possibility of a gap period, but courts have
split on how to determine whether the uncorrected Bankruptcy
Reform Act applies to a case. The second question is whether, for
cases filed under the uncorrected Bankruptcy Reform Act during
the gap period, educational loans may be discharged.
The Law Applicable During the Gap Period
Some courts have approached the issue of dischargeability in
cases potentially affected by the gap period by selecting a date
which determines the law applicable to the case at hand. Two lines
of cases have emerged from this approach. One line holds that the
law as of the filing date of the bankruptcy petition governs the
issue of dischargeability;87 the other, that the law in force at the
time of discharge controls.86 It is submitted that the choice of the
discharge date as determinative is erroneous. Courts using this
date appear to have shown insufficient regard for persuasive authority in the Bankruptcy Reform Act and Supreme Court opinions, and have erred in relying on appellate level precedents whose
36. Dray, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 969, ranks highest on the list of
disingenuous rationales. The court held the corrective bill applied to the whole
gap period from the Bankruptcy Reform Act's enactment through the effective
date of October 1, 1979, contrary to the holdings of other courts. The court in
Dray rested its remarkable holding on language in the corrective bill which states
that the amendment's effective date is the date of enactment of "this Act." The
court interpreted "this Act" as referring to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, not the
amendment to the Bankruptcy Reform Act effected by the corrective bill. As
though admitting this interpretation of the corrective bill rested on policy and not
the statutory language, the court justified its refusal of discharge on the importance of construing the Bankruptcy Reform Act in a manner consistent with congressional intent.
37. E.g., In re Bruce, 3 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Littell, 6
Bankr. 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Sawaya, 2 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1979); In re Taylor, 190 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 632 (Bankr. D. Me. 1978).
38. In re Piccione, 1 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1979); In re Freeman, 5
Bankr. 24 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980); In re Upsher, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB)
1062 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Utterback, 1 Bankr. 199 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1979).
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reasoning is superficial.
The court in In re Piccione89 generated the view that the law
in effect at the time of discharge governs. 0 In this case, the debtor
filed bankruptcy during the gap period. The issue of dischargeability of educational loans arose, however, after the Bankruptcy Reform Act became effective. The court held that the time
of discharge determined the applicable law and applied section
403(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act which had taken effect as of
that date. As earlier noted, section 403(a) provides that gap cases
shall be decided as if the Bankruptcy Reform Act had not been
enacted.4' Absent the Bankruptcy Reform Act, there would have
been no repeal of the discharge-barring section 439A. Accordingly,
the court held section 439A applicable to the discharge of Piccione's educational loans. Other courts have followed the Piccione
time of discharge analysis and have relied on precedent cited in
that case.'
This reliance appears to be misplaced. The Piccione court
cited In re Carter" and Lockhart v. Edet4" for the dubious proposition that the law in force at discharge controls matters relating
to discharge. However, it would appear that Carter and Lockhart
hardly stand for such a proposition. Those cases did apply the discharge law in effect at time of discharge, and that law had been
changed by an intervening amendment while the cases were pending.' 5 But, the amendment of the discharge law directed the courts
to apply the amended law to pending cases if practicable.' Indeed,
at least two other opinions of that period confronting the same is7
sue applied the law in effect when the bankruptcies were filed.' It
39. 1 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1979).
40. E.g., In re Utterback, 1 Bankr. 199 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1979).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
42. See, e.g., Utterback, 1 Bankr. 199; Freeman, 5 Bankr. 2.

43. 32 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1929).
44. 23 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1928).
45. The change in law involved deletion of language which required a showing of intent for the objection to discharge because debtor failed to maintain
financial records. The amended law made for an easier case for barring debtor

from discharge. The amendment, enacted May 27, 1926, was to become effective
August 27, 1926. Amendment of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 18, 44 Stat. 662, 667.
46. The amendment provided: "[T]his amendatory Act shall govern proceedings, so far as practicable and applicable, in bankruptcy cases pending when it
takes effect . ..

.

47. Morton v. Snider, 20 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1927); In re Wyatt, 23 F.2d 350

(E.D. Va. 1927).
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appears that the narrower proposition for which Carterand Lockhart stand is that the courts should apply an amendment to a
pending case when the amendment so directs.
Following this principle, courts should apply the law in effect
on filing under the Bankruptcy Reform Act because the savings
section of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, section 403(a), refers to
transitional cases in terms of when the "case [is] commenced. 4 8
Even more importantly, the corrective bill, which was concerned
solely with educational loan dischargeability, dealt with cases
"commenced" after it took effect.4 9
In addition, as noted by the Piccione court, a number of Supreme Court bankruptcy opinions have applied the law as of the
filing date of the bankruptcy petition, although none dealt with the
matter of discharge.8 0 Nevertheless, these Supreme Court decisions
arguably are pertinent to Bankruptcy Reform Act gap period cases,
especially considering the clear distinction noted above between
such cases and the cases of Carter and Lockhart. The Piccione
court thought the latter controlling; however, they arguably are not
even apposite.
Use of the law in effect at the filing date, however, does not
mean that educational loans would be dischargeable merely because the bankruptcy petition was filed during the gap period.
Courts have found such loans nondischargeable under the law in
effect on filing. 51 Candid recognition of the legislative error and a
studied effort to deal with the issues raised by the error is preferable to an unexamined choice of law as of the discharge date. If the
courts have authority to correct obvious technical errors in legislation,"" they should exercise that authority. The difficulty in opera48. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a).
49. Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387.

50. United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939); White v. Stump, 266 U.S.
310 (1924); Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913); Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625

(1913).
51. In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 125

(1981); Wisconsin Higher Educ. Bd. v. Lipke, 630 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980).

52. In refusing to give effect to the premature repeal of § 439A, the Adamo

court stated that "[tihe result of an obvious mistake should not be enforced, particularly when it 'overrides common sense and evident statutory purpose.' United
States v. Babcock, 530 F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown,

333 U.S. 18, 26, 68 S. Ct. 376, 380, 92 L. Ed. 442 (1948)." 619 F.2d at 222. The
Babcock and Brown courts both refused to give strictly literal effect to words of

penal statutes under consideration when to do so would have frustrated clearly
manifested congressional intent. Accord Lipke, 630 F.2d at 1230. See also Peter
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tionalizing this principle is that courts disagree about whether the
error in the Bankruptcy Reform Act causing the gap period is sufficiently obvious for judicial correction.5" However, the highest
courts to consider the point have corrected the error," and in doing so have provided continuity between the Bankruptcy Act and
the Bankruptcy Code sections pertaining to discharge of educational loans.
DETERMINATION OF THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL
LOANS FOR CASES FILED UNDER THE UNCORRECTED BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT

Two circuit courts of appeals have dealt with the issue of educational loan dischargeability for cases filed during the inadvertent
gap period. Both courts held the subject educational loans nondischargeable on the basis of legislative intent.'5 The courts in In re
Adamo and Wisconsin Higher Educational Aids Board v. Lipke
thought that an obvious legislative drafting error should not be enforced, especially when enforcement would override common sense
and apparent statutory purpose.56 Since Congress did not intend to
repeal the prohibition against the dischargeability of educational
loans, the courts disregarded the premature repealer 57 and proceeded as if section 439A were still in effect.s By this judicial construction, both courts eliminated the unintended gap period and,
as noted earlier,' 9 the decisions to eliminate the gap period seem
clearly consonant with the intent of the Bankruptcy Code
drafters.0°
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); FDIC v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943).
53. In re Freeman, 5 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).

54. See cases cited supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Adamo, 619 F.2d at 222.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
58. Adamo, 619 F.2d at 222. See also In re Southard, 2 Bankr. 124 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1979).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
60. At least one bankruptcy court has disapproved judicial reconstruction of
§ 402(d) (under which the literal repeal of § 439A by § 317 occurs on the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act). In re Freeman, 5 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980). Freeman focused on whether § 317 was intentionally included in §
402(d). The court in Freeman indicated that courts should rarely change fundamental provisions of a statute like enactment dates, repeal dates or effective
dates. Id. at 26. Guided by that premise, the court was not convinced that inclu-
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The Adamo/Lipke view is not without its critics. Courts act
mischievously when they retroactively nullify rights given by the
proper law-making authority, it may be claimed. Thus, debtors
who elected bankruptcy during the gap period in order to discharge student loans have a right to discharge such loans. This argument, however, presupposes both a legal right, and some alteration of that right by the court. On the other hand, when a court
denies a controversial claim of right, it has not betrayed the principle against abjuring the law retroactively. To succeed, an argument
against the Adamo and Lipke analysis, based on the unfairness of
retroactivity, requires a showing that debtors did have an uncontroverted right to discharge educational loans during the gap
period.
The contention that the right of discharge during the gap
period undeniably existed rests on the plain language of sections
317 and 402(d), by which the nondischargeability of educational
loans under section 439A was repealed effective November 6, 1978.
The language of the statute may be interpreted as granting a right
of discharge by repealing the bar to discharge in terms so clear
that no controversy could arise about the question. Proponents of
the right of discharge might further claim that controversy only
arose after repeal and was manufactured out of the legal fiction of
legislative intent. These proponents might say that a look at the
statute on November 6, 1978, is all that the courts should undertake, and that whatever the good or ill of the policy that the statute furthers, the law is what the statute says, not the policy which
a different statute would effectuate. Controversy, the argument
would conclude, improperly arises from the policy, not the law.
The answer to these arguments is that on November 6, 1978,
and no later, the language of the statute, notwithstanding the legislative history, showed a clear and obvious conflict on its provisions. Section 403(a), as noted earlier,61 requires determination of
cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Act (all cases filed before
the Code took effect October 1, 1979) "as if the Bankruptcy Reform Act had not been enacted." Determination of the dission of § 317 in § 402(d) contradicted legislative intent. The court pointed to the
frequent review and revision of § 402(d) in Congress without deletion of § 317
from its terms. The court's analysis in Freeman, however, overlooks the fact that
frequent review and revision can still result in a drafting mistake. Congress's passage of the corrective bill contradicts the court's finding in Freeman that Congress intended the gap period.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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chargeability of educational loans could not be the same as if the
Bankruptcy Reform Act had not been enacted if section 439A were
no longer in force. The immediate repeal of section 439A made
such a result impossible.
Confusion lay on the face of the statute as soon as it became
law. On that date, the language of the statute seemed to indicate
both that educational loans would no longer be generally nondischargeable, a change in prior law, and that cases should continue
to be determined as though no change in law had occurred. The
statutory language cannot be said to create a clear unqualified
right to discharge. Rather, the statutory language creates confusion
as a result of the contradictory provisions applicable to the discharge of educational loans. For this reason the sense of unfairness
felt by debtors misled by the Bankruptcy Reform Act's repeal of
section 439A is no more justified than any other party denied a
claim based on an ambiguous law. The claimed right of discharge
was not an improper retroactive denial of an established right.
Contrary to a number of bankruptcy court decisions on the
matter,"" the issue is not a choice between following the plain language of the statute or following legislative intent contrary to the
statutory language. Language that bewilders a reader with inconsistent meaning is in no sense "plain" and requires statutory construction. Courts fail in their responsibility when they choose arbitrarily to apply inconsistent legislative passages rather than to
interpret the law in a manner which carries out the true legislative
intent.
DISCHARGEABILITY

OF EDUCATIONAL LOANS UNDER BANKRUPTCY
CODE CHAPTER

7

Chapter 7 Liquidation
Debtors may discharge an educational loan in a liquidation
proceeding under section 523(a)(8) in two circumstancess 8 which
reflect the congressional reconciliation of the fresh start goal of
bankruptcy law and the putative abuse of that goal by graduating
students seeking a headstart by discharging educational loans."
1980); In re Kidwell, 4
62. E.g., In re Bruce, 3 Bankr. 77, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Bankr. 685, 687 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Dodd, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d
(MB) 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
63. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
64. The Senate report indicated that:
The Committee bill seeks to eliminate the defense of bankruptcy for a
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Like its predecessor,"6 the present section grants discharge of an
educational loan if the loan "first became due before five years...
before the date of the filing of the petition," 6 or if "excepting such
debt from discharge . . . will impose an undue hardship . . .
Although legislative history relating to section 523(a)(8) is
sparse, there is no doubt of Congress's intent in enacting it." Section 523(a)(8)(A), as did its predecessor, prevents the headstartminded former student from eliminating his or her educational
debt upon graduation by discharge in bankruptcy. However, some
people, even former students, are entitled to bankruptcy's fresh
start, and may obtain discharge of their educational debt if they
present a case of undue hardship. The undue hardship discharge is
available to educational loan debtors whatever the status of the
loan: before it is due, after it is due or if it is in default. The congressional requirement for a showing of undue hardship in order to
discharge a recent educational loan seems a fair means of achieving
the fresh start goal for the hopelessly indebted individual. Bankruptcy under revised chapter 13 is preferred for individuals with
hope of working out their indebtedness." Bankruptcy under chapter 7, on the other hand, should be sought only by the truly hopeless who ought to easily qualify for the undue hardship discharge.
Occasionally debtors liquidate under chapter 7 when they
properly ought to seek relief under chapter 13. Such an incorrect
choice may result from poor counseling or from the jurisdictional
limitations of chapter 13.70 For debtors who belong in chapter 13,
satisfying the undue hardship requirement for discharge of educafive-year period, to avoid the situation where a student, upon graduation,
files for a discharge of his loan obligation in bankruptcy, then enters
upon his working career free of the debt he rightfully owes. After a five-

year period, an individual who has been faithfully repaying his loan may
really become bankrupt. He should not be denied this right, and is not
under the Committee bill.
S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 4713, 4744.
65. Higher Education Act of 1965, § 439A, 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (re-

pealed 1978).
66. 11 id. § 523(a)(8)(A).
67. Id. § 523(a)(8)(B).
68. See In re Hemmen, 7 Bankr. 63, 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980); In re Bell, 5
Bankr. 461, 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
69. Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to
Payment to and Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20
WASHBURN

L.J. 1 (1980).

70. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tional loans may be more difficult than for a truly hopeless debtor.
Similarly, bankruptcy judges are likely to hold different views on
who is truly hopeless and under what circumstances continuation
of the educational debt would constitute undue hardship. As one
bankruptcy judge recently noted, beyond the classic case of undue
hardship one finds little guidance. 1
For these reasons, there remain important questions about the
dischargeability of educational loans in chapter 7 under section
523(a)(8). Before addressing the judicial decisions on the substance
of section 523(a)(8), however, some procedural matters should be
considered.
Procedure Under Section 523(a)(8)
The court which decides the issue of educational loan discharge can be as important as the substantive law under which the
discharge is sought. The repealed Bankruptcy Act and the present
Bankruptcy Code do not generally require a bankruptcy court to
decide whether a particular debt, such as an educational loan, is
dischargeable.7 2 Although a bankruptcy court must decide the dischargeability of debts incurred as a result of misrepresentation,
fraud, or willful and malicious injury78 which are all excepted from
discharge, a bankruptcy court does not have mandatory jurisdiction over educational loans. 4 Educational loan creditors or the
debtor may put the issue of educational loan discharge before a
bankruptcy court.7 5 In uncertain cases a debtor may be well advised to litigate the dischargeability issue in another forum. For
example, when dischargeability is a defense to a collection effort, a
court of general jurisdiction may be more receptive to pleas of undue hardship than a bankruptcy court which may be inured to
tales of financial woe. Creditors may be guided by contrary considerations. Either could conceivably run into laches or estoppel con71. Hemmen, 7 Bankr. at 66.

72. COLLIER, supra note 17, at $ 523.31.
73. Section 523(c) requires a creditor who is owed a debt that may be ex-

cepted from discharge under paragaraph (2), (4) or (6) of § 523(a) (false statements, embezzlement or larceny, or willful and malicious injury) to initiate proceedings in the bankruptcy court for an exception to discharge. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977).

74. The bankruptcy court has original but not exclusive jurisdiction; its jurisdiction is concurrent with the appropriate local court. COLLIER, supra note 17, at 1
523.31.
75. BANKR. R. 409(a)(1).
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tentions should the matter not be disposed of in the bankruptcy
case.
The important point is that the status of an educational loan
upon a discharge order for the debtor may be uncertain if the parties do not obtain a resolution of the issue from the bankruptcy
court. Truly hopeless debtors should obtain an undue hardship
ruling from the bankruptcy court. In cases where the issue of undue hardship is not clear, it would seem that the creditor should
request a ruling from the bankruptcy court if the debtor does not.
A recent development in the case law gives incentive for creditor
initiative in resolving the issue of undue hardship in a bankruptcy
case. In several liquidation cases, the courts allowed only partial
discharge of debtors' educational loans and required periodic payments to the creditors for the undischarged balance of the loans.7
Automatic Stay
Another procedural matter affecting educational loan debts is
the automatic stay of creditor action which the debtor receives
upon filing bankruptcy under chapter 7." Creditors may not undertake or continue any collection activities, in or out of court,
from the time of filing the petition for relief under chapter 7 until
the earliest of three events: the closing of the bankruptcy case, dismissal of the case, or the grant or denial of discharge to the
debtor.7 8 In a few exceptional situations, creditor action may proceed despite the stay, but those situations require court approval
and are unlikely to arise in educational loan collection.7 9 Even
withholding the former student's transcript may violate the automatic stay, 80 as will be discussed later.
Even if an educational loan is clearly nondischargeable under
section 523(a)(8), the automatic stay temporarily bars collection
activity.8 It is incorrect to suppose that the stay does not apply to
nondischargeable debt. Bankruptcy provides debtors with a temporary sanctuary and leaves to creditors the burden of accelerating
the end of the stay period by appropriate in-court procedures."s
76. See, e.g., In re Littell, 6 Bankr. 85 (Bank r. D. Or. 1980). See also infra
text accompanying notes 145-53.

77. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
78. Id. § 362(c)(2).
79. Id. § 362(b).

80. In re Heath, 3 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1980).

81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
82. Id. § 362(d).
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Violation of the automatic stay carries both the legal sanction of
contempt of court and the practical deterrent of the loss of the
court's good will.8"
Other Grounds for Holding Educational Loans Nondischargeable
The Bankruptcy Code lists nine types of debts which are excepted from discharge under a chapter 7 liquidation." Educational
loans are the eighth exception. However, even if an educational
loan is dischargeable under the eighth exception, it may not be discharged if any one of the other exceptions applies. Indeed, prior to
adoption of the educational loan exception, creditors under the Act
had to use these other provisions to except a debt created by an
educational loan from discharge.
At least one creditor had success in preventing discharge of an
educational loan debt under the second exception which prohibits
the discharge of a debt incurred through debtor misrepresentation.85 The new Code has revised the language of the second exception only slightly,s' codifying case law construing this provision to
require that the creditor's reliance be reasonable."s However, difficulty should be expected by a creditor in establishing that a written statement was "materially false" and given by the debtor "with
intent to deceive." Procedurally, as noted above, the second exception must be decided by the bankruptcy court in which the petition is filed."
Another exception that may apply to an educational loan
arises in favor of any creditor whose debt the debtor failed to list
or schedule in his statements filed with the court.8' Unless the
creditor received notice or had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy
case, the debt is not discharged if neither listed nor scheduled. 90
Reaffirmation of the Educational Loan
Reaffirmation agreements 1 receive extensive treatment in the
83. 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, at
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
as "[a]n

362.03.

Abbott v. Regents of the University of Cal., 516 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1975).
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(i), (iii).
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977).
See supra note 73.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).
Id. § 523(a)(3)(A).
Section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a reaffirmation agreement
agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration
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new Code. Accordingly, practices which developed under the Bankruptcy Act require revision." Although there may be little reason
for debtors to reaffirm dischargeable educational loans, especially
if the practice of refusing transcripts is barred under present law,
creditors should be familiar with the reaffirmation procedure which
for the first time is prescribed by bankruptcy law.
The Code requires a hearing on reaffirmation agreements."
The hearing takes place after the court decides to grant the debtor
a discharge. At the hearing, the court must inform the debtor that
any reaffirmation agreement he might wish to make is not required
by law, and of the legal effect and consequences of such an agreement and default thereunder." Additionally, the court must approve reaffirmation of consumer debt at the hearing.' 5 Since educational loans certainly are consumer debts, any reaffirmation of
these loans will require court approval. Generally, approval of reaffirmation should be difficult to obtain, except in cases where a reaffirmation results from settlement of litigation over the issue of
dischargeability of the educational loan." A lesser test for approval
applies to such settlement reaffirmations. So long as the parties
"entered into" the settlement reaffirmation agreement "in good
faith," the court should approve it.'7 In this context, "good faith"
would mean without chicanery of any sort by the creditor. In close
questions of dischargeability of the loan, settlement by reaffirmation of part of the loan may be quite convenient for both the creditor and the debtor.
The stricter test for consumer debt requires that the reaffirmation impose no undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent
and must be in the best interest of the debtor.'8 The first part of
this test appears to preclude reaffirmation of debt resulting from
educational loans under chapter 7 since dischargeability of the
debt in most cases is dependent on a finding of undue hardship to
for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case
under this title."
92. Under the Bankruptcy Act there was no prohibition against reaffirmation
and such agreements were enforceable. The new Code prohibits enforcement of
the reaffirmation of a discharged debt unless first approved by the court. Id. §
524(c), (d).
93. Id. § 524(d).
94. Id. § 524(d)(1).
95. Id. § 524(c)(4).
96. Id. § 524(c)(4)(B).
97. Id.

98. Id. § 524(c)(4)(A).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the debtor. The second part of the test seems also likely to preclude reaffirmation of educational loans. Arguably, finding reaffirmation to be in the debtor's best interest, measured economically,
is not logically impossible; however, it would seem virtually impossible in practice.
No Discharge
Occasionally, individual debtors file bankruptcy under chapter
7 although they do not qualify for discharge." Section 727(a) provides a complete list of all the objections which bar a discharge. 1 "0
One of the most likely of the section 727(a) objections to arise in
the context of an educational loan is that the debtor was previously granted a discharge in a case within six years of the current
case.0' The six-year period is measured from the date of filing of
the previous bankruptcy petition to the date of filing of the current
petition. 02
Likewise, but with an important exception, a debtor who
previously filed bankruptcy under chapter 13 may not receive a
discharge under chapter 7 in current proceedings. 10 The important
99. In the case of individuals, a chapter 7 filing without eligibility for discharge would occur only by mistake or rarely by an involuntary creditor petition.
Id. § 303. There is no good reason for an individual to liquidate without obtaining
a discharge.
100. Section 727(a) bars discharge if the debtor: (1) is not an individual; (2)
with intent to defraud or delay creditors has removed, destroyed or concealed his
property; (3) has concealed or destroyed records relating to his financial condition; (4) has made a false oath or claim, gave or received money for acting or
forbearing to act, or withheld from an officer of the estate books or records relating to his property or finances; (5) has failed to explain satisfactorily any loss or
deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities; (6) has refused to obey a court order, or
to testify after either being granted immunity or improperly invoking the privilege against self-incrimination; (7) has committed an act specified in (2) through
(6) above within one year preceding the case; (8) has been granted a discharge in
a case commenced within six years preceding the present case; or (9) has executed
a written waiver of discharge which is approved by the court.
101. Section 727(a)(8) bars discharge if "the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section 1141 of this title, or under section 14,371
or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six years before the
date of the filing of the petition[.]"
102. Id.
103. Section 727(a)(9) bars discharge if:
the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1328 of this title,
or under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced
within six years before the date of the filing of the petition, unless pay-
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exception permits discharge under chapter 7 in current proceedings if the debtor paid off one hundred percent of all unsecured
claims from the prior chapter 13 proceeding; or, seventy percent of
unsecured claims if the chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith
and was the debtor's best effort.10"
THE

Two GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGING EDUCATIONAL LOANS UNDER

THE

BANKRUPTCY CODE

Section 523(a)(8)(A): Old Loans
Debtors may obtain the fresh start offered by chapter 7, unburdened by educational loans, if the loan "first became due before
five years before the filing of the petition."' 0 5 Typically, these old
loans did not become due until nearly a year after studies terminated, and some loans probably will have been made early in the
debtor's college career."" A small controversy has arisen out of the
language of section 523(a)(8)(A) over when the subject educational
loan "first became due."
The facts of In re Brown illustrate the controversy over the
phrase "first became due" in section 523(a)(8)(A). 0 7 The debtor
filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on February 5, 1980. Among
his debts was an educational loan in the amount of $3200 which
was owed to a bank and guaranteed by a state educational agency.
This $3200 debt originally arose during the period from 1969 to
1972. The series of notes the debtor signed for each loan stated
that payments were to commence at the earlier of March, 1974, or
nine months after the debtor ceased being a full-time student. For
reasons undisclosed by the opinion, the debtor signed an installment note on August 5, 1974, which consolidated his several loans
from the 1969 to 1972 period. This new note called for monthly
payments for ten years at the same interest rate as the notes consolidated. Finally, the note provided that the entire balance would
ments under the plan in such case total at least(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or

(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and

(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and
was the debtor's best effort ....

104. Id.

105.
106.
CONG. &
107.

Id. § 523(a)(8)(A).
S. R"'. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
AD. NEWS 4713, 4730.
4 Bankr. 745 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).

CODE
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become due should the debtor fail to make an installment payment.
The court in Brown ruled that since the student loans first
became due "in mid-1974," they were dischargeable. The court rejected the bank's contention that the installment note consolidating the previous loans, and not the original rescinded notes, controlled. The court curiously reasoned:
When the subsequent obligation [the consolidating installment
note] became due is irrelevant in the instant proceeding; were it
otherwise the student loan in issue (and all similar student loans)
would never be discharged. Simply put, if default on note to...
[the] Bank were held to be the first date in which the obligation
became due, it would be five years before that obligation could be
discharged in bankruptcy. Were this interpretation to obtain the
student loan in question would be potentially nondischargeable
for up to fifteen years, ten years being the term of the note plus
the additional five years provided by the code. This is in contradistinction to the plain language of the statute and the clear intent of Congress.108
How the court imagined the creditor's contention could lead to
fifteen years of nondischargeability of the loan is not clear. At first
blush the bank appears to have claimed that the consolidated note
was the obligation at issue. However that, apparently, is not the
crux of its argument. That particular note was executed August 15,
1974, and thus presumedly first became due the following month.
That would be either September or October 1974, which in light of
the February, 1980, date of the chapter 7 filing, would clearly have
been "before five years before the filing of the petition." Therefore,
the bank's contention would fail even if the court had accepted the
date of the consolidated debt as the relevant temporal measurement point.
The bank's real contention must have been the educational
loans under section 523(a)(8)(A) are dischargeable only to the extent that each installment became due before five years before the
filing of the petition. Under such an analysis, installments due
within five years of the filing date or thereafter would be nondischargeable. The court properly rejected such an interpretation of
section 523(a)(8)(A).'" 9
The statutory language of section 523(a)(8)(A) suggests that
108. Id. at 746.
109. Id.
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each educational loan should be treated indivisibly, not as installments. The language reads, "unless . . . such [educational] loan
first became due before five years. . . before the date of... filing
. .. 110 The quoted language makes no reference to the divisibil-

ity of an educational loan. Thus, an interpretation is yielded from
the statutory language that the loan is dischargeable in whole. Yet,
a tenable alternative interpretation of the statutory language does
support the argument intended by the bank in Brown, and that
alternative interpretation merits amplification.
The note in Brown contained an acceleration clause which automatically accelerated the whole obligation in the event of default
of any monthly payment. Presumedly, such an acceleration clause
is standard practice in the field. Suppose the debtor in Brown had
at the time of bankruptcy considerably reduced his debt on the
loans, and had not defaulted in any monthly payment before the
statutory five-year period. Thereafter, the debtor defaulted. When
did the educational loan first become due? The court in Brown
ruled that the loan first became due when the first installment
came due. However, at that time the whole educational loan would
not have become due. In fact the whole educational loan did not
become due until the time of default for it was at that time that
the acceleration clause rendered the balance of the loan due. For
this reason, the statutory language which seemed to imply that an
educational loan should be treated indivisibly may arguably support the interpretation of section 523(a)(8)(A) put forward by the
bank in Brown.
Beyond the statutory language, however, there are the
standard practices in student lending and the policy goal of the
statute which must be given consideration in interpreting section
523(a)(8)(A). Loan repayments generally commence nine months
after studies terminate. The abuse Congress sought to remedy in
excepting student loans from discharge was the "quickie" postgraduation discharge."' A five-year waiting period apparently prevents this abuse of student loan programs. Acceptance of the
bank's interpretation of section 523(a)(8)(A) put forward in Brown
would have the peculiar effect of retarding the opportunity for borrowers who consistently make payments under these extended
term obligations (usually ten years) to discharge educational loan
debt in the earlier repayment years. At the same time, borrowers
110. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A).

111. See supra note 64.
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who default early in the repayment period are given earlier opportunity to seek discharge of their educational debt. Indeed, if educational lenders omitted the acceleration clause from their loan
notes, the court in Brown would be quite correct in its observation
that the period of nondischargeability would amount to fifteen
years, the ten years of scheduled payments plus five years as prescribed by section 523(a)(8)(A). Until the ten years ran, the whole
loan would not become due, and only then would the five-year
waiting period begin.
The bank's interpretation must also fail, as it did in Brown,
because review of the legislative history discloses that the five-year
waiting period starts when the repayment of the loan starts.
"[T]he Committee bill prohibits discharge in bankruptcy.

. .

for a

five-year period after the repayment obligation starts.""' Moreover, the Report of the Commisson on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States,"' which originally recommended a limitation on
the dischargeability of educational loans in bankruptcy, made clear
that the five-year waiting period should begin when "the first payment of any installment.

. .

was due .

114
-.

Several other points about old education debts should be
made. First, in bold yet unnecessary dictum one bankruptcy court
stated that "the burden is on the creditor to show that the loan
first became due before five years before the date of filing petition.
Otherwise the loan is presumed discharged. ' ""5 The burden of
proof in this context seems fairly unimportant. The date upon
which repayment began seems hardly a contestable fact in typical
situations involving educational loans. Perhaps, though, this dic-

tum indicates a judicial hostility to educational lenders who raise
questions of law involving statutory interpretations of section
523(a)(8)(A). For example, fact situations like the one in Brown
involving a consolidation of several loans raise the legal issue of
whether the repayment period of the several prior loans or the repayment period of the consolidated loan starts the five-year waiting period. The burden of establishing an interpretation of section
112. Id. (emphasis supplied).

113. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.

No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, 176 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION REPORT).

114. Id. at Pt. II, 136.
115. In re Wright, 7 Bankr. 197, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980) (emphasis
supplied).
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523(a)(8)(A) favorable to itself may fall heavily on the creditor.
Second, assuming that the five-year period begins with the repayment obligation of the original loan as the court held in Brown,
a prospective bankrupt needs to consider each educational loan individually to determine which are dischargeable by section
523(a)(8)(A). The five-year period applies to each of the loans according to their individual repayment schedules and not to the
educational loans in aggregate. 1
Third, a small, though perhaps germinal, practice has begun
under the other provisions of section 523(a)(8) in which bankT
ruptcy courts have divided an educational loan and discharged
only that portion which would impose undue hardship on the
debtor.1 17 Such a practice may spread to the bankruptcy courts'
application of section 523(a)(8)(A). A court could construe section
523(a)(8)(A) to discharge only that portion of a particular loan
which becomes due before the start of the five-year waiting period.
As noted above, such an application by the courts would run contrary to congressional intent. A more reasonable interpretation of
section 523(a)(8)(A) would be that the educational loan is wholly
discharged once five years pass after the first repayment installment is due.
Finally, the five-year waiting period excludes "any applicable
suspension of the repayment period." In most student loan situations the student will obtain a suspension of the repayment period
by continuing his education, which will effectively defer the dischargeability period. Calculation of the suspension period, however, may become problematic.
The case of In re Kaufman"8 suggests a fair test of how to
measure the suspension period in a factual context likely to recur.
The debtor funded undergraduate study through loans received
during 1969 through 1973 and began repayment in late 1974.
Shortly thereafter, the debtor sought and received deferment of
further monthly repayments because he was to attend graduate
school. The lending bank also made'the loan for graduate study,
and the note the debtor signed required the debtor to inform the
bank promptly of any changes occurring in his school enrollment
116. Id.
117. In re Hemmen, 7 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980); In re Littell, 6
Bankr. 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Archie, 7 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1980); In re MacPherson, 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 178 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1978).
118. 9 Bankr. 755 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
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status. The note also stated the debtor's expected graduation date
as May, 1977. However, the debtor spent only one semester in 1975
in graduate school, and did not inform the bank of his withdrawal
from enrollment.
In late 1977, the bank advised the debtor that the loans would
mature again in February, 1978 (which would have been the usual
nine months after graduation). On June 19, 1978, the debtor executed another repayment agreement which consolidated the undergraduate and graduate school loans, but subsequently made no
payments. The bank received payments by the guarantor, Pennsylvania Higher Educational Assistance Agency, which brought a
complaint in the debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The
complaint sought a determination that the debtor's educational
loan was not dischargeable.
The court in Kaufman held the loan nondischargeable because
the five-year period had not run.119 The debtor had filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 in April, 1980. The debtor agreed that the
graduate school loan did not meet the five-year test, but contended
that the undergraduate loan satisfied the waiting period because it
first became due in May, 1974, which was five years and eleven
months before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The debtor
had spent five months attending graduate school, but even deducting those five months, the five-year period still had been met.
The court, however, found that the five months in graduate
school was not the measure of the suspension period. Rather, it
held that the debtor received "in effect" a suspension of the loan
for three years and seven months."1 0 Accordingly, the loan remained nondischargeable. The court's selection of the longer suspension period was based on the debtor's failure to inform the
lender (and guarantor) of his termination of graduate study. The
debtor had agreed to notify the lender of any change in his enrollment status at the time he took out the loan for graduate study.
The lending bank had, as the court noted, "relied upon [the] expected graduation date" and evidently took no action until after
that date."'1 The debtor had no legal right to that suspension period, but managed to obtain it by a combination of his breach of
promise to notify and the lender's failure to discover the lapse in
enrollment. In construing the suspension period as it did, the court
119. Id. at 758.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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in Kaufman had read the phrase "any applicable suspension" in
including unauthorized suspensions as well
section 523(a)(8)(A) as
1 2
as authorized ones.
The court's analysis in Kaufman might be faulted because the
onus of the failure to obtain prompt reinstitution of repayment
could have been placed on the lender and the guarantor rather
than on the debtor. Perhaps other bankruptcy courts will do so. A
reading of the pertinent Code language as applying only to the suspension periods authorized or provided for by law would have such
a result.
Section 523(a) (8) (B): Undue Hardship
Educational loans are dischargeable under chapter 7 whenever
"excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents .
".1..,
"Undue hardship" is a new concept in discharge law. The issue of undue hardship differs from the retrospective analyses typical in chapter 7 liquidations. Whether an educational loan ought to
be discharged is similar to prospective questions common to reorganization proceedings. In many instances it will be true that the
debtor will be under a hardship if discharge of educational debt is
not granted. But, in some instances discharge of other obligations
will mean that continuing the educational loan obligation will impose no undue hardship on the debtor. Whether repayment of an
educational loan will impose an undue hardship following bankruptcy is a prospective question requiring a predictive analysis.
Sometimes the answer is no more than a best guess that Congress
requires the bankruptcy judge to make.
Several judges have drawn a distinction between the hardship
surely consequent to a resort to bankruptcy court and the statute's
more stringent requirement of undue hardship. To reflect the import of this qualitative distinction, as previously noted and later
discussed, courts have begun to limit discharge to that portion of
the educational loan, the payment of which would impose the leg24
islatively intolerable burden of undue hardship on the debtor."
Perhaps no more than portraits of undue hardship come out of
the reported decisions. Somewhat surprisingly, courts have not
122. Id.

123. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).
124. See supra note 117.

, 350
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confined their analysis to the financial situation and prospects of
the debtor. Instead, bankruptcy courts also have considered the
contribution the funded education has made to the debtor's welfare. 2 5 This contribution may aid or hinder the discharge of the
loan. Other subjective factors emerge from the existing case law.
A court's resolution of the issue of undue hardship as a ground
for discharging a student loan is not only an exercise of judgment,
but also reflects the equitable nature of a bankruptcy court. Although there are cases in which bankruptcy courts attempt to follow rigid principles of law in resolving.the issue of undue hardship,
the courts also point out that each case must be regarded on its
own facts. The question of how to view the facts of a case persists.
In attempting to resolve the facts in an undue hardship case, the
applicable Code provision should be regarded as the beginning of
the analysis and not its end. Those who await crystal-clear appellate court principles may never receive satisfaction.
The Two Approaches to Undue Hardship
Two distinguishable approaches emerge from the developing
case law. These range from the rigid "unique factors" dictum in In
re Kohn12 to the analytical criteria set forth by the Bankruptcy
27
Commission.
The court in Kohn would grant an undue hardship discharge
only to debtors "severely disadvantaged economically as a result of
unique factors which are so much a part of the bankrupt's life, present and in the foreseeable future, that the expectation of repayment is virtually non-existent unless by that effort the bankrupt
strips himself of all that makes life worth living." '28 Not surprisingly, the court refused a discharge to Mr. Kohn, who lacked
dependents but who had received notice of an impending employment termination. The court stated: "[Ilf temporary unemployment were the basis of discharge, bankrupt parties would be encouraged to come here unemployed, seek an undue hardship
discharge and then seek gainful employment."1 19
125. In re Fonzo, 1 Bankr. 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Hemmen, 7
Bankr. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980); In re Conrad, 6 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1980).
126. 20 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 994 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
127. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 113, at Pt. II, 140.
128. Kohn, 20 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) at 1008.
129. Id. at 1009.
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Both the court's "unique factors" dictum and its holding concerning the impact of "temporary unemployment" may not enjoy
wide following, for Kohn posed a poor case for undue hardship.
While employed, Kohn's income exceeded expenses by about $175
per month. The facts in Kohn, thus, did not involve any of the
factors indicated in the dictum: (1) severe economic disadvantage;
(2) unique factors causing severe economic disadvantage; (3) reason to believe the debtor would have to reduce himself to subhuman existence to succeed in repayment. Kohn, therefore, stands
for the proposition that continuation of an educational loan obligation in the face of the impending unemployment of a debtor otherwise capable of repaying an educational loan will not constitute an
undue hardship.
In two other cases, In re Archie and In re Densmore,130 the
courts repeat Kohn's broad dictum in poor fact situations for a
finding of undue hardship. The debtors in both cases had gainful
employment and could not even pass an economically disadvantaged test, let alone present the courts with unique factors. The
debtor in Archie blamed her academic and employment difficulties
on a weight problem, but she tendered no medical reports to substantiate her contention. 3 1 Nor were her employment "difficulties"
understandable given that she held a full-time job at the time of
filing bankruptcy and that she had some expectation of a salary
raise. However, the court actually denied discharge on the dubious
ground that the debtor failed to pass an implied test of good faith
in that she had not notified the lender when she left school, and
3
she had not tried to work out a payment schedule for her loan.1 1
The debtor in Densmore was employed, although seasonally
so. Moreover there were two other factors in his case which undermined his claim of undue hardship.1 s8 First, the debtor had completed a course in brick and concrete masonry, supported by the
loan at issue, but had not used this training. Second, the debtor
had also reaffirmed two secured debts during the bankruptcy proceedings, and the court approved these reaffirmations which required a finding that they did not impose undue hardship.1 " On
the basis of these facts, the Densmore court found no undue hard130. In re Archie, 7 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Densmore, 3

COLLIER BANKE. CAS. 2d (MB) 471 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).

131.
132.
133.
134.

7 Bankr. at 717.
Id. at 719.
Densmore, 3 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) at 472.
See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
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ship and denied discharge of the debtor's educational debt.
Although the courts in Archie and Densmore denied discharge, they did grant some relief in the form of extending and
revising the educational loan repayment schedules. In both cases
the courts followed the strict Kohn "unique factors" test, yet provided some relief to debtors short of discharge. It then might be
expected that similar relief could be obtained from a bankruptcy
court which applied a less severe test of undue hardship than that
of Kohn. However, the source of the court's authority to extend or
otherwise revise payment terms of a nondischargeable educational
loan is not clear. Presumably, it comes from the inherent equitable
powers of a bankruptcy court, for nothing in section 523(a)(8) provides for more than a ruling on dischargeability.
It should be noted that even under the less severe approach to
undue hardship taken in the Commission Report, the three foregoing cases likely would not have resulted in discharge of the educational debts. The Commission Report states:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt
will impose an "undue hardship" on the debtor,

[1] The rate and amount of his future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of
[A] Ability to obtain, retain and continue employment
and the rate of pay that can be expected.
[B] Any unearned income or other wealth which the
debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken
into account.
[2] The total amount of income, its reliability and the periodicity
of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor and his
dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their management capability, as well as to pay the educational debt.188
The test stated in the Commission Report appears purely economic, an income statement projection. Some courts have gone no
further.' Others have combined income projection with what may
be called "good faith" factors, such as whether the debtor would
benefit unjustly from the funded education.13 7 The test applied is
135. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 113, at Pt. II, 140-41.
136. In re Baker, [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)

67,985 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Bagley, 4 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1980); In re Matthews, [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
67,049 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1979); In re MacPherson, 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB)
178 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1978).
137. In re Hemmen, 7 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980); In re Archie, 7
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not always clear.
In In re Fonzo, 88 the court discharged a $1000 debt from an
educational loan which the debtor had taken out to support his
schooling in accounting. The debtor had a non-working spouse and
four dependent children. His monthly expenses exceeded his income by about $300. His financial pressures were serious, not at all
dominated by the educational debt. The court found the debtor's
future financial resources insufficient to support his family "at a
break-even level." 1

9

A review of the debtor's statement of monthly expenses in
Fonzo, however, suggests that he could have possibly reduced expenses to a break-even level and perhaps even lower.1 40 Had this
been in fact possible, it is not clear how the court would have
treated the hardship issue under the Commission test of a "minimal standard of living." 4 ' For example, the debtor had two car
loans which required payments of $176 per month. Presumably the
car loans were dischargeable but reaffirmed. However, does a "minimal standard of living" require two cars or even one? The debtor
lived in the New York metropolitan area where mass transportation is available.
Perhaps Fonzo stands for a "break-even" test of undue hardship, but two factors suggest otherwise' First, one should regard
the "break-even" point as a factual finding, not a legal conclusion.
Otherwise a profligate, which the debtor in Fonzo hardly seemed,
would qualify for an undue hardship discharge. Second, the court
made a point of emphasizing that the debtor did not financially
benefit from the educational loan. Nothing in section 523(a)(8)(B)
suggests different treatment of educational loans that benefit the
borrower from those that do not. Education may result in less
tangible benefits than increased earning power. Perhaps in close
cases of undue hardship, a court should take into account the value
of the educational experience supported by the loan. It is not clear
why the court felt such a consideration was appropriate in Fonzo,
unless it had unexpressed reservations about the debtor's "breakeven" point and considered the issue a close call. The gratuitous
discussion of debtor benefit from the loan suggests such reserBankr. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Price, 1 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. D. Hawaii
1980).
138. 1 Bankr. 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979).
139. Id. at 724.
140. Id. at 723.
141. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 113, at Pt. II, 140-41.
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vations.
Why courts might distinguish educational loans which
financially benefit a debtor in a present or foreseeable way from
loans that do not is easily understood. Without a financially beneficial educational loan, the debtor would not have had the extra
income which might derive from improved employment circumstances, the fruits of the loan. It is arguably unfair to allow the
debtor to enjoy this benefit, but at the same time obtain a discharge of the educational loan which was the source of this benefit.
However, such an argument should not apply to an undue
hardship discharge situation. First, the statute does not have any
provisions which would authorize the beneficial/nonbeneficial distinction. Second, the argument based on unjust enrichment is irrelevant to the policy reasons behind Congress's prohibition of educational loan discharge. The issue is not whether people who receive
educational loans which help them financially should be able to get
a discharge of the educational debt. Congress has determined that
people generally may not obtain a discharge of these debts,
whether or not there has been financial benefit to the borrower.
Congress decided that educational loans from governmental or
non-profit institutions are so universally beneficial that "quickie"
bankruptcy discharges had to be banned lest such abusive practice
jeopardize the political support for the loan programs.
The actual relevance of financial benefit from a loan to a determination of undue hardship lies in the supposition that someone who has benefited from an education really is under no undue
financial hardship. That undoubtedly will be the case so long as
education has value in the marketplace. A determination of
financial benefit is just one step in the more general hardship analysis: whether the debtor can afford to pay the loan and maintain a
minimal standard of living. Therefore, the educational benefit distinction made by courts supports the broad proposition that people who received educational loans should repay them because generally such people will be in a position to repay the loans without
undue hardship. But the broad proposition should not determine
particular exceptional cases.
Arguably the proposition is not useful in a close case, such as
Fonzo, even as a "close-call" determinant. Under the present statute, the educational lender will fully receive the return of any enrichment it has provided the debtor by its general right to collect
an educational loan even after the debtor's bankruptcy, and arguably such return is at the expense of other creditors in "close-call"
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undue hardship cases. Relative to other members of the class of
creditors, then, the educational lender has received better treatment. Indeed, the exceptions to discharge protect only one other
14 2
specific creditor group and no other particular class of lenders.
In close questions of undue hardship, an analysis of the extent to
which a debtor received a benefit from an educational loan will
more likely result in undeserved and unnecessary favorable treatment for educational lenders rather than furtherance of the fresh
start policy of chapter 7.
In Archie and Densmore, the courts refused to discharge the
educational loans but revised the repayment schedules by extending the repayment term of the debt.1 43 Similarly, other recent
cases have found no undue hardship under the Commission test,
but instead have reduced the educational loan in a manner similar
to a chapter 13 composition."'
In a thoughtful undue hardship opinion, the court in In re
Hemmen found that continuation of the educational loan would
result in an undue hardship, but instead of discharging the loan,
the court gave the loan guarantor a conditional judgment for the
full amount of the loan.1 4 5 The debtor had lost most of his wealth
to his former spouse as a result of a divorce. He held no job. The
court found him living "in an almost poverty level style. '"1 6 Yet,
the court recognized that "discretion exists in the Bankruptcy
Court to determine the remedy of 'undue hardship' resulting from
temporary lack of income, which by its nature can ameliorate or
change."14 7 The remedy selected by the court was judgment for the

loan with "supervison of the judgment for a short term of years,
with an adjustment of payments according to some formula related
to income to be earned in the future. '"14 The court's judgment effected a formula under which the debtor could discharge the total
indebtedness by (1) making best efforts to find suitable employment in a reasonable length of time, and (2) applying on the judg-

142. Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge debts "to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such
spouse or child . ..."
143. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
144. In re Littell, 6 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re MacPherson, 19
COLLIER BANKR. CAS.

145.
146.
147.
148.

(MB) 178 (Bankr. N.D. Wis. 1978).

7 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980).
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 67.
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ment the excess of his earnings over $3600 per year, after taxes, to
the payment of the judgment for five years from maturity of the
last loan owed this lender. " 9
The court in In re Littell likewise rejected the "all or nothing"
approach to educational loan discharge and found that over $7000
of educational debt would impose undue hardship to the debtors. 1 0 The Littells had made serious attempts to keep expenses
low, such as gathering firewood for heating and making their own
clothes. They had failed to obtain teaching jobs after college where
they majored in education and English. They had obtained employment; however, their income was insufficient and their family
was still left with a modest deficit. Furthermore, the court found
no reason to believe that their employment or economic situation
would improve in the next few years. 5 ' Accordingly, the court
found that to require full payment of their educational loans would
cause undue hardship, but concluded that some payment could be
made and ordered each to pay ten dollars per month for a specified
period. 15 That period measured the remainder of the five-year
waiting period of section 523(a)(8)(A) and resulted in the Littells
being required to pay $810 on about $7000 of educational debt.
The Littell court criticized the practice of complete discharge
or complete nondischarge and accused some bankruptcy judges of
taking the position that a debtor should not be able to walk away
from student loan obligations unscathed. The court noted that
such a position "has resulted in judgments of nondischargeability
where the facts clearly showed hardship."'5 8 The court properly
disavowed hostile attitudes to educational borrowers that would
deprive them of the right of discharge for undue hardship. The
court explained why it thought bankruptcy courts were in error in
placing the entire burden on the debtor who seeks an undue hardship discharge. Without documentation, the court noted the "great
pressure and temptation on the part of college authorities to encourage students to apply for loans and grant them when in effect
it is not a sound economic thing to do."'" Such an observation
may unfortunately be all too accurate. The Court stated: "[T]his
should be a substantial factor in determining whether a student
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
6 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88.
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loan should be discharged. '" 5
Perhaps the position taken by the court in Littel is incorrect
in considering the economic soundness of an educational loan when
analyzing the question of dischargeability and, for the same reason,
the court in Fonzo was incorrect. 1 " In Fonzo, the court emphasized the effect of the loan-funded education on the present economic situation of the debtor. However, in Littell the court suggested that the soundness of the loan at its inception should be
considered in determining dischargeability. However, the undue
hardship economic test proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission
rejects such considerations since the Commission incorporates a
projection or predictive economic test: whether foreseeable income
could adequately be used by the debtor to maintain a minimal living standard and to pay the educational debt.' 7
The courts' considerations in Littell and Fonzo of the advisability and benefit of the educational loans would only be relevant if
the undue hardship question focused retrospectively or presently.
The concerns would then help weed out the lazy (or the profligate)
debtor. However, as the Commission test of undue hardship requires an objective projection of what income level the debtor may
reach with effort, no need arises to inquire into the prior advisability or present benefit of an educational loan. Such inquiries are
quite difficult to answer, especially those involving the wisdom of a
loan at its origination. Courts should eschew such inquiries and focus on the true issue of whether the debtor can foreseeably be capable of paying the educational debt while maintaining a minimal
living standard.
The Commission test, the Littell opinion and the other opinions discussed all support the trend towards partial discharge of
educational loans because of undue hardship. Though Congress did
not directly authorize such partial discharge, surely the trend
properly rests on the concept Congress laid before the courts. If
full payment would impose undue hardship, and yet full exoneration would not strike a fair adjustment, debtors are more likely to
be denied any relief absent the availability of partial discharge.
Such a result would offend the underlying principle of the undue
hardship discharge and a contrary result would offend any principle of fairness. The courts will strike the fairest balance by recog155. Id.

156. See supra text following note 141.

157. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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nizing and applying the partial discharge option.
EDUCATIONAL LOANS UNDER CHAPTER 13

Chapter 13 debt adjustment plans may have a substantial effect on educational debt since the Bankruptcy Code has significantly altered a debtor's ability to obtain a composition of unsecured debt. Under prior chapter XIII, the debtor needed the
assent of creditors in order to have the bankruptcy court confirm a
plan. 5' The Code, however, eliminates the requirement of creditor
assent,' 5 ' and provides instead two principal standards to test a
plan: (1) a plan must be proposed in good faith,'"6 and (2) unsecured creditors must receive no less under the plan than what
they would receive were the debtor to have liquidated under chapter 7 on the effective date of the plan."' Composition plans may
well become the norm under the new law with the obstacle of creditor assent to the composition removed. Educational debt, like
other unsecured debt, would appear then to be subject to this unilateral composition power of the debtor under chapter 13.
In composing the debt, that is, reducing the total debt to an
amount the debtor can manage through periodic payments under
the plan, the debtor does not merely delay repayment. Under
section 1328(a) he obtains a full discharge of debts provided for by
the plan. 1 2 To the creditor's disadvantage, chapter 13 erases the
debt so long as the plan is completely performed. Complete
performance means no more than performing the obligations
assumed under the plan, and the obligations under a composition
will be less than the true pre-bankruptcy debt. Complete performance discharges all debt provided for by the plan with two exceptions: (1) alimony, maintenance and support debt, as specified in
section 523(a)(5);"1 and (2) long-term debt under section
158. Under § 652 of the Bankruptcy Act, a plan could not be confirmed unless accepted by a majority of unsecured creditors and by all secured creditors
whose claims were dealt with in the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976) (repealed 1978).
159. Section 1325 establishes that acceptance of the plan by unsecured credi-

tors is not required. Subsection (a)(5) also removes the absolute veto power of a

secured creditor by providing for alternative treatments for a secured creditor
who has not accepted the plan.
160. Id. § 1325(a)(3).

161.
162.
ligations
163.

Id. § 1325(a)(4).
Alimony, maintenance and support payments, and certain long-term obare excluded. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1977).
Id. § 1328(a)(2).
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1322(b)(5).'" As many have already recognized, the complete performance discharge of section 1328(a) provides far better relief
than is available under chapter 7.16

The increased availability of chapter 13 plans resulting from
elimination of the obstacle of creditor assent, as well as the
broader discharge provided under chapter 13, has made chapter 13
the preferred bankruptcy relief for the individual debtor. Even a
debtor who foresees difficulty in completing the composition plan
may well opt for filing under chapter 13 over chapter 7, since section 1328(b) grants a hardship discharge for incomplete performance of the plan."' This chapter 13 hardship discharge leaves the
debtor no worse off than a chapter 7 discharge since the chapter 13
hardship discharge excepts only nondischargeable debts under
chapter 7,167 and the long-term debt nondischargeable even if the

debtor completes performance of the composition plan. 1 "
Some debtors might fairly be said to have been taking, or trying to take, a perverse advantage of the new law. Nominal and
even zero payment plans have been proposed. The obvious purpose
of these plans has been to obtain the more favorable discharge
available under section 1328(a). In substance, such plans are no
more than chapter 7 liquidations, 69 and unsecured creditors commonly receive just what they might have received under chapter
7-nothing. Debtors succeed in obtaining the discharge by showing
that the plan is proposed in good faith and that creditors will receive under the plan no less than the distribution which would
have come to them under chapter 7. The broad exemption provisions of the Code greatly assist debtors in making the latter
showing.
Great controversy currently exists about the legality of such
plans. Congress has considered amendments to chapter 13 which
would limit its availability to true repayment plans, precluding

164. Id. § 1328(a)(1).
165. See supra note 74.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) allows discharge when failure to complete the
payments is "due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable[.]"
167. Id. § 1328(c)(2).
168. Id. § 1328(c)(1).
169. See, e.g., In re Bloom, 3 Bankr. 467, 471-72 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); In
re Campbell, 3 Bankr. 57, 59-60 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Hall, 4 Bankr. 341,
343 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
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zero or nominal payment proposals.170 Even absent amendment,
the bankruptcy courts have been troubled by such plans and a majority of the reported decisions reject nominal or zero payment
plans as lacking the good faith necessary for confirmation.' 7 ' Other
courts have felt obliged to follow Congress's mandate and approve
even zero payment plans. 17 Both positions are supportable. Those
courts which approve nominal payment plans interpret the Code
confirmation standard of good faith as meaning no more than the
phrase "proposed in good faith" has previously meant in bankruptcy law: that the debtor comes to the court with a plan untainted by any fraud or trickery in its formulation. 7 8 These courts
see the issue of good faith as simply procedural and consider the
substance of the plan, that is, what it proposes to pay creditors, as
quite irrelevant to that issue. 7 4 The courts which have refused
confirmation of nominal payment plans have interpreted the good
faith standard as being broader than the old definition. Such
courts measure a party's good faith by the substance of the plan.
These courts require meaningful, substantial or best effort payment proposals for the plan to satisfy the good faith standard.' 7 5
Besides the objection to a composition plan based on levels of

good faith, three other arguments have been put forth to prevent

discharge of educational loans in chapter 13 proceedings. These are
170. The so-called Technical Amendments Bill would have changed 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) to require that the plan represent "the debtor's best effort."
S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188 (1979). The accompanying Judiciary Committee Report included the comment that "[t]he purpose of ... subsection
1325(a)(3) is to prevent the use of chapter 13 composition plans by debtors having
a demonstrated ability, but not the willingness, to make whatever payments their
particular circumstances reasonably permit over and above their primary obligations to support themselves and their dependents during the extension period."
H.R. R"'. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980).
171. See, e.g., In re Marlow, 3 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Hall,
4 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1980); In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Bloom, 3
Bankr. 467 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1980).
172. See, e.g., In re Webb, 3 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Terry,
3 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980), rev'd, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In re
Harland, 3 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Sadler,
3 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
173. E.g., Harland,3 Bankr. 597; Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584; Terry, 3 Bankr. 63.
174. See cases cited supra note 172.
175. See cases cited supra note 171.
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the long-term debt exception to discharge based on sections
1328(a)(1) and 1322(b)(5); a modified good faith argument; and an
argument that discharge is prohibited on the basis of sections
523(a) and 1325(a)(4). In In re Smith, the only reported decision
in which a college argued that the debtor's long-term (educational) debt was nondischargeable under sections 1328(a)(1) and
1322(b)(5), the court rejected the contention on the basis of the
permissive nature of section 1322(b)(5). 17 ' The court stated, "Not
all long-term debts are entitled to be excepted from discharge, as
the college contends, but only those debts which the debtor wishes
to continue treating as long-term debts. The court has no power to
force the debtor to treat any specified debt as a long-term debt as
1
a condition to confirming its plan." 7
The court in Smith relied on Collier on Bankruptcy for the
proposition that "the debtor [may] take advantage of a contract
repayment period which is longer than the chapter 13 extension
period. 17 8 Furthermore, that treatise points out that it would be
unfair to include this long-term debt within the section 1328(a)
discharge since full repayment would not have been made at the
1 9
close of the plan. 7
In Smith the court denied confirmation of the debtor's composition plan because the plan had not been proposed in good
faith.1 80 Thus the court's discussion of the dischargeability of an
educational loan as long-term debt under sections 1328(a)(1) and
1322(b)(5) is only dictum. However, the analysis in the opinion of
the debtor's good faith in offering the composition plan offers yet
another argument for educational lenders seeking to thwart discharge. The court held that Smith's composition plan was not in
good faith because the plan proposed relatively small repayment of
debt, a high percentage of which was comprised of student loans.181
Because such loans are generally nondischargeable in a chapter 7
proceeding, the Smith court noted that courts should take care to
insure that no abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit will occur
through the liberal discharge provisions of chapter 13. The court
176. In re Smith, 8 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
177. Id. at 547.
178. Id.
179. COLLIER, supra note 17, at I 1328.01(1)(c)(i).
180. 8 Bankr. at 548.
181. The student loans comprised approximately 66% of the debtor's unsecured debt, and the proposed repayment on unsecured debts was approximately
at 16% return. Id. at 547-48.
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found that the high percentage of nondischargeable debt in
Smith's situation required more than the minimal amount of repayment he proposed in his plan."'
The court's analysis in Smith may be viewed as a modified
good faith concept based on two factors. First, the court followed
those substantive good faith cases 1 83 which require some showing
that the provisions, purpose and spirit of chapter 13 are satisfied.
Second, Smith recognized that a composition plan under chapter
13 which would seek discharge of debt nondischargeable under
chapter 7 is arguably offered in bad faith.6 ' However, it does not
appear that this court would require that the plan call for substantial repayment of such debt in every case in determining the issue
of good faith, but rather would regard all the factors bearing on a
given situation including the amount of nondischargeable debt relative to the total debt.
In the case of In re Yee, the educational lender objected to
confirmation of the debtor's composition plan on the ground that
the plan did not satisfy the section 1325(a)(4) requirement that
unsecured creditors receive not less than the amount that would be
paid on such claim were the debtor to have liquidated under chapter 7V185 As discussed above, this is one of the principal standards
for confirmation of a chapter 13 composition plan. The lender contended that the requirements of section 1325(a)(4) are not met unless a composition plan proposes full payment to a creditor holding
a debt that is nondischargeable under the provisions of section
532(a).186 In re McMinn8 7 adopted such a construction of section
1325(a)(4). Accordingly, educational lenders would be well-advised
to consider raising this argument in opposition to confirmation.
Most courts, however, including the one in Yee, have rejected the
argument.188 •
The argument based on sections 1325(a)(4) and 523(a) as advanced in these cases is that a creditor with a nondischargeable
182. Id. at 548.
183. See cases cited supra note 171.
184. 8 Bankr. at 547-48.
185. 7 Bankr. 747, 759 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
186. Id.
187. 4 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980). But see In re Chaffin, 4 Bankr. 324
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
188. In re Yee, 7 Bankr. 747, 759 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Marlow, 3
Bankr. 305, 307 (Bankr. N.D. IM.1980); In re Koerperich, 5 Bankr. 752, 754
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1980); In re Jenkins, 4 Bankr. 278, 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
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debt in a chapter 7 proceeding may continue to collect the debt
until it is paid in full. Since the creditor would receive full payment under chapter 7, section 1325(a) requires that he should receive no less under chapter 13.189 The argument fails, however, because the language of section 1325(a)(4) requires that the creditor
receive under the chapter 13 composition plan that distribution
which creditors would receive from a chapter 7 liquidation. 0 That
distribution means the amount of money "that would be paid" on
each claim.' 9' A lender is not paid in any sense, however, by holding a debt which is nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The debtor
may pay someday, or may be coerced into payment by proper collection efforts, but this will occur long after the effective date of
the plan, which is the measuring point of section 1325(a)(4). Thus,
discharge of an educational loan is possible notwithstanding the
provisions of sections 1325(a)(4) and 523(a).
PRACTICE OF WITHHOLDING TRANSCRIPTS OF COLLEGE WORK FROM
DEFAULTING STUDENT BORROWERS

Collection of Educational Loan While Case is Pending (and
Before Discharge)
Creditors must proceed carefully once a debtor files a petition
with the bankruptcy court. Section 362(a) of the Code imposes a.
stay of collection activity, and this stay applies to all entities or
activities except those listed in section 362(b) which will not be
discussed in this article. The stay ordinarily continues until the
debtor receives his discharge.' 9 ' Creditors may petition the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay,' 93 but educational lenders are
unlikely to obtain such relief.
A prevalent collection tactic among colleges has been the refusal to release educational transcripts to students who default on
189. Marlow, 3 Bankr. at 307; Jenkins, 4 Bankr. at 280.
190. Section 1325(a)(4) contains the language "not less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date[.]"
191. Yee, 7 Bankr. at 759; Jenkins, 4 Bankr. at 280; Marlow, 3 Bankr. at 307;
Koerperich, 5 Bankr. at 754.

192. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) terminates the stay at the earliest of three events:
the time the case is closed [§ 362(c)(2)(A)]; dismissed [§362(c)(2)(B)]; or discharge is granted or denied [§ 362(c)(2)(C)]. The earliest of these three in the case

of an individual will be the time of grant or denial of discharge.
193. Id. § 362(d).
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their educational loans. 1' These transcripts are valuable to former
students as they are invariably necessary for employment or continuing studies elsewhere. Bankruptcy implications aside, no legal
challenge to this practice has yet been uncovered by the author.
Two grounds for challenge are conceivable: (1) withholding transcripts violates a constitutional right because it unconstitutionally
deprives a person of his property without due process of law; 195
and (2) withholding transcripts constitutes an unfair collection
practice.'" That such challenges would succeed in nonbankruptcy
cases appears doubtful.
The automatic stay of actions cannot be found inapplicable to
the practice of withholding transcripts unless the college is found
not to be "acting" in refusing a transcript to a debtor in bankruptcy. Subsection 362(a)(6) bars "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case ... ." So long as the refusal to
issue a transcript is an act (which arguably it is) and the purpose
of the refusal is collection of the debt, it is an act to collect a claim
within the meaning of section 362.
The legislative reports indicate that section 362(a)(6) is to be
194. It should be remembered for the sake of clarity that, for purposes of this
discussion, there are four types of loan defaulters: (1) defaulters who have not
been or are not now in bankruptcy; (2) defaulters who have a bankruptcy case
pending; (3) defaulters who have received a discharge of their educational loans;
and (4) defaulters who were denied discharge of educational loans. The analysis
that follows shows that transcripts may be withheld from types (1) and (4), but
not from (2) and (3).
195. As yet, the courts have not recognized a student's property interest in
transcripts. E.g., Hansome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
Surely, the student has a contractual right to transcripts, but this right is limited
customarily or expressly by the correlative duty to keep current with fees and
loan obligations. Spas v. Wharton, 106 Misc. 2d 180, 431 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1980). There seems no violation of a legal duty or due process in a college's
refusal to perform a contractual service-issuance of transcripts--for which the
student's correlative duty remains unperformed. It is possible that a court might
be persuaded. that the duty to issue transcripts is independent of the former student's duty to meet loan payments and so grant relief on a contract basis. As yet,
a contractual failure to perform, alone, is no basis for a due process challenge.
The contractual theory generally seems no more tenable than the two listed
in the text accompanying this note. A contract-based challenge to transcript withholding, bankruptcy implications aside, is also less likely to affect other institutions than the due process or unfair collections process theories. The contract theory will depend more, it seems, on the particular facts of a case.
196. Cf. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, 1692.
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given a broad reading. The House report states that "[p]aragraph 6
prevents creditors from attempting in any way to collect a prepetition debt. '' 197 Presumably, "in any way" would include the coercion exerted on the debtor by refusing transcripts. In two reported cases, In re Heath and In re Ware, 198 the automatic stay
provision was interpreted as barring colleges from refusing transcripts to debtors who have filed bankruptcy under chapter 13.
Such an interpretation should extend to chapter 7 liquidations as
well since the stay of section 362 also applies to chapter 7.V" The
courts in Heath and Ware both concluded that section 362(a)(6)
had legislatively reversed case law under the Bankruptcy Act
which had held the automatic stay to be limited to formal legal
proceedings of debt collection.20 0 The facts in both cases disclosed
that the sole purpose of denying the debtor a transcript was debt
collection. The court in Heath found such conduct to be in clear
violation of section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.20 1
Although it seems clear that while a bankruptcy case is pending, colleges and universities may not refuse to issue transcripts,
when the stay terminates, refusal of transcripts raises another
problem. Section 525 prohibits discrimination by governmental
units against former bankrupts, but this section would apply only
to public colleges and universities. In contrast, both public and private institutions fall under the stay of section 362(a)(6). In addition to the protection of section 525, however, the discharged
debtor may also rely on section 524(a)(2), which enjoins collection
actions and applies to both public and private institutions, as authority for obtaining a transcript.
197. H.R. RzP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977).
198. In re Heath, 3 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Ware, 9 Bankr.
24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
200. Prior case law, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir.
1977), actually did not concern the stay of collection action while the case was
pending. Cases like Girardierraised the issue of withholding transcripts after the
debtor received a discharge. That case fell under the Bankruptcy Act, § 32(f)(2)
which narrowly refers to legal "action" or "process" as held by the court in
Girardier.The issue in Heath and Ware thus differs from that in the pre-Code
cases, and Heath and Ware are likely correct in their obiter that Girardier'sresult is reversed under the Code.
201. Heath, 3 Bankr. at 355.
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Constitutional and Statutory Limitations on Discrimination
Against Discharged Debtors by Refusing Transcripts
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, courts had
held public institutions bound to turn over transcripts to debtors
whose educational loans had been discharged by bankruptcy.2 2
The basis for such holding lay in the supremacy clause and the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Perez v. Campbell 03 that
state action which conflicts with the fresh start policy of bankruptcy legislation is unconstitutional. Though the Court never has
ruled on the transcript issue, lower courts have applied the Perez
holding to that issue.20 Because only state actions are implicated
by the supremacy clause, private institutions were held to be free
to withhold transcripts.0 5
Section 525 codifies the Perez ruling.'" Section 525 bars "governmental units" from discriminating against debtors because of
bankruptcy. By its terms section 525 applies during bankruptcy as
well as after discharge, and so may help the debtor in bankruptcy
to resist subtle forms of discrimination outside the scope of the
stay of collection activity in section 362(a). For example, the court
in Heath noted that refusal of a transcript during pending bankruptcy proceedings violated section 525 as well as section 362(a)(6).
However, clearly the principal purpose of section 525 is to prohibit
post-discharge conduct of governmental units which conflicts with
2 07
bankruptcy policy.

The conduct proscribed by section 525 is defined broadly in
order to allow courts discretion in application of its provisions as
appropriate. Section 525 provides that "governmental units may
not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license permit,
charter, franchise, or other similar grant . . . or discriminate with
respect to employment . . . ." Nevertheless, the section indicates

that governmental units may deny or refuse such "grants" so long
as the basis of the conduct is not "solely because" of present or
former bankruptcy, insolvency prior to discharge or failure to pay
a discharged debt. Thus, a public institution may refuse to issue a
202. Hansome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978); Lee v.

Board of
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Higher Ed., 1 Bankr. 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979).
402 U.S. 637 (1971).
See cases cited supra note 202.
Girardier,563 F.2d 1267.
H.R. REP. No. 585, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 366 (1977).
Id.
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transcript where the customary issuance fee is not tendered, but
may not refuse solely because a discharged loan has not been paid.
Accordingly, the transcript issue resolves into whether or not the
refusal to issue a transcript was motivated by an intent to discriminate because of the failure to pay the discharged debt. The courts
should find, as in Heath, that a refusal by a public university to
issue a transcript when the appropriate transcript fee has been
paid to be "solely because" of the discharged debt and, therefore, a
violation of the prohibitions of section 525. Of course, it is expected that a fair amount of educational debt is nondischargeable
and section 525 leaves public universities free to refuse transcripts
until the nondischargeable debt has been repaid. If some of a
debtor's loans have been discharged, only repayment of the nondischargeable loans may be demanded as a condition for issuing a
transcript.
Section 525 constitutionally may apply only to governmental
units. Nevertheless, private colleges and universities must take
care when considering post-discharge transcript refusal. Debtors
will, no doubt, prompt the courts to adopt a more expansive view
of "governmental unit" and the legislative history clearly states
that the courts are free to extend the Perez doctrine as they see
fit.'08 First, the debtor might argue that the college is not really
private, but rather has a public character and serves a governmental function; as such, state action is sufficiently present for the
supremacy clause/Perez analysis, or that the college is a "governmental unit" for purposes of section 525. Alternatively, the debtor
might argue that other sections of the Code, most likely section
524(a)(2),'20 9 bar refusal of a transcript to a discharged debtor.
Of these two arguments, it is more probable that the courts
will find the second persuasive. As yet, no decision has been found
in which a debtor has raised the argument of section 524(a)(2)
against a private college in order to force issuance of a transcript.
The similarity in the language of section 524(a)(2) with that of section 362(a)(6) makes such an argument quite plausible. Each subsection operates against "any act to collect" with a temporal distinction: section 362(a)(6) operates on the filing of the petition
208. Id. at 367.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) provides that a discharge in a bankruptcy case
"operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset any such
debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor, whether
or not discharge of such debt is waived . .. ."
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commencing the case whereas section 524(a)(2) bars "any act, to

collect . . . any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the
debtor, or from property of the debtor . . . ." A private college

which refuses a transcript is acting to collect a discharged loan "as
a personal liability of the debtor." However, the temporal distinction makes the section 362(a)(6) cases, such as Heath, potentially
distinguishable from situations in which section 524(a)(2) might be
applicable. Thus, private colleges should review court decisions interpreting section 524(a)(2) to determine whether a practice of
transcript refusal on a discharged debt may violate the "injunction" of section 524(a)(2).
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the clear statutory prohibition against discharge of federally supported educational loans, controversy continues to arise over their status in bankruptcy proceedings. Although most courts have held these student loans nondischargeable during the "gap period," they have not used consistent
analyses or reasoning in reaching this conclusion.
In chapter 7 liquidations, the two limited circumstances under
which student loans may be discharged have generated much litigation, with the full scope of these circumstances yet to be resolved. Moreover, the extent to which the terms of repayment may
be revised, and the status of these loans under a chapter 13 composition is far from established at this time.
Finally, the practice of withholding transcripts from those former students who have defaulted can be expected to receive attention in the courts in the future. Educational lenders as well as borrowers would be well-advised to keep abreast of both developments
in the courts and legislative clarification in this controversial area
of bankruptcy law.

